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European style electoral politics in ethnically divided society:  
The case of Kosovo 
 
Laura Wise & Timofey Agarin 
 
Our paper takes as its starting point the premise that elections are central moments in 
the life of polities: these are the times when individual citizens demonstrate support or 
otherwise of political institutions and regimes, assess their accountability and set 
agendas for the next government. In short, elections allow us to observe whether and 
how political regimes live up to society’s expectations. This issue has particular 
resonance in deeply divided societies that have experienced ethnic conflict in the past. 
In the deeply divided society of Kosovo, local and national elections in 2013 and 2014 
presented an opportunity to analyze voter choices and elite agendas, with the presence 
of ethno-political issues under scrutiny. Our paper concludes that the normalization of 
electoral politics, within the context of European aspirations, has not yet taken place in 
Kosovo, and that the options available to the electorate continue to be dominated by 
identity politicking.  
 
Over the past 25 years, the region affected by the dissolution of the Federal Socialist 
Yugoslavia has seen content of political debate linked considerably to ethnic identity issues. 
This resulted in interethnic violence, emergence of ethnocentric nation-building projects, and 
centrifugal institutional politics. Following a long period of ethno-political gestation among 
Albanian-speakers, violence between the Albanian minority in southern Serbia and Serbian 
security forces, the war in Kosovo and particularly the NATO bombings in March 1999, 
Kosovo declared independence in 2008, supported by many Western states. Since then, the 
international community has maintained a large, although gradually diminishing, institutional 
presence in the country. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which governed 
immediately following the NATO intervention in 1999, was replaced in 2008 by the more 
technical and advisory European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Both missions were 
established with the intentions of democracy promotion, to foster democratic institution-
building and the empowerment of democratic political actors, as well as to contribute to the 
creation of favourable conditions for democratisation.1 However, the vision that eventual full 
executive powers would be transferred to Kosovo state institutions was delivered in a top-down 
manner from the European organisations through cooperation with domestic political elites. 
Despite Kosovo’s pursuit of fully recognized statehood, the status of the territory has 
remained contested by Serbia and much of the Serb majority residing in northern Kosovo. If 
anything, this points out the limitations of a narrow vision of democracy promotion, in part 
attested to the EU, and underlines the importance of elections and safeguarding political 
liberties. Indeed, some observers argue that though legitimizing new political institutions and 
                                                 
1 Sonja GRIMM and Okka LOU MATHIS, ‘Stability First, Development Second, Democracy Third: The European 
Union’s Policy towards the Post-Conflict Western Balkans, 1991–2010’, Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 6 (3 July 
2015): 916–47. 
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democratic political process via citizen participation at the ballot box, such an approach 
highlights the pivotal role of civil rights for all state citizens for meaningful participation in 
politics. As such, regular and competitive elections are simply not enough to usher in and 
normalize democratic politics in the absence of consensus about the beneficiaries of the 
democratic process.2 The importance of Kosovo’s status and administrative boundaries for 
Serb majority municipalities means that despite their overall size in the territory of Kosovo, 
issues of ethno-regional representation directly impact on policies of the new state, and at times 
directly challenge the notion that Kosovo citizenship is inclusive of all ethnic groups.  
In this regard, Kosovo elections are paramount events in the life of the new democratic state, 
established with an immense international assistance. Holding of elections in post-conflict, 
deeply divided society is often less about the everyday issues of municipal governance, such 
as healthcare provision and education, and more as a test for the sustainability of political 
institutions. Although municipal elections were held in 2009 and parliamentary elections in 
2010, the Serb community in the north of Kosovo boycotted both. Attempts to solicit Serb 
participation in Kosovo institutional structures have been made through the European Union-
brokered normalization dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade since 2010, which sought to 
resolve the issue of parallel governance of Kosovo’s Serb majority municipalities supported by 
Belgrade, particularly in the Mitrovica North, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic 
municipalities north of the River Ibar. This lead to the ‘First agreement of principles governing 
the normalization of relations’, known as the ‘Brussels agreement’, signed by both Kosovo and 
Serbia, which facilitates the participation of the Serb majority municipalities in local elections, 
and also provides for the formation of an Association/Community of Serb Municipalities 
(A/CSM) following successful local elections.  
The significance of the Serb minority’s participation, and the support that this had from the 
Serbian government in both the 2013 and 2014 elections demonstrates that the contests 
involved competition for ethnic votes. While society in Kosovo is still divided over 
understandings of state ownership and the direction of the nation-state building, the two 
elections we discuss in this paper hardly allow observers to see them as foundational moments 
in the functioning of Kosovo as a multi-ethnic democratic state. As the impact of ethnic issues 
in electoral campaigns is a widely used indicator in post-communist area studies,3 we 
hypothesize that in the context of different experiences of ethnic groups with political 
institutions and political leadership, the perceived effects of the European Union integration on 
the building of domestic institutions have not been delinked from ethnic politicking in electoral 
process. By scrutinizing the case of Kosovo, the main research question we ask addresses the 
existence of a correlation between levels of ethno-political mobilization and successful political 
entrepreneurs’ capitalization of these agendas after the elections. Thus, our focus is on the 
impact of ethnic cleavage on the viability of electoral politics for both of the main ethnic groups 
in Kosovo, and we ascertain that any shift from group-based preferences affects the electorate’s 
behavior in electoral politics in this young European democracy. As the ethnonational divide 
                                                 
2 Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 5–21. 
3 Daniel BOCHSLER, Territory and Electoral Rules in Post-Communist Democracies (Houndmills, 2010); 
Milada Anna VACHUDOVA, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism. New 
York, 2005. 
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dominated the debates and election outcomes in Kosovo, we spell out issues that have 
prevented the ‘normalization’ of electoral politics and allowed identities to comfortably 
dominate the background of all political deliberations. 
 
Democratization and State building in Divided Societies 
A classic political science argument says that a political system becomes institutionally 
democratic with the installation of competitive elections and multiple political parties.4 
However, it remains incomplete until an overwhelming majority of the elected representatives 
unconditionally support democratic procedures, play by the rules of the democratic game and 
are accountable to all citizens of the state.5 Both the scholarly community and policy circles 
recognize that what political elites make of democratic institutions and institutional opportunity 
structures is a key component of what makes democracy work.6 Therefore, electoral politics 
reflect the process in which individual citizens partake in order to achieve specific outcomes, 
and are hard to imagine without their instrumental value, endorsing contenders’ ability to shape 
the more hands-on, practical solution to individual preferences.7 The literature on electoral 
politics also makes clear that this multi-layered phenomenon is in place – and most often, likely 
to stay – not only because of political actors, but also because the electorate shape politics as 
both a normative and practical political process. 8 
Many scholars regard the unconditional institutionalization of democracy when candidates 
and, later, representatives principally decide and act on an issue, and not identity, basis to 
ensure their electoral success.9 On the other hand, the effectiveness of an electoral system based 
on levels of inclusion of multiple social cleavages, into policy making is particularly important 
in societies rigged by deep cleavages as well as in post-conflict conditions.10 Here, political 
representatives accountable to a narrowly defined electorate, be it regional, socioeconomic, or 
ethno-cultural groups, tend to import clientelist relations into the forum of political decision 
making and impede successful normalization of politics.11 This is particularly important as 
                                                 
4 Robert A. DAHL, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). 
5 Ronald INGLEHART and Christian WELZEL, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human 
Development Sequence. New York, 2005; Ronald INGLEHART, Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, 
Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, 1997. 
6 Gabriel A. ALMOND and Sidney VERBA, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations, Princeton, 1963; Harry ECKSTEIN, ‘A Culturalist Theory of Political Change’, American Political 
Science Review 82, no. 3 (1988): 789–804. 
7 Samuel H. BARNES et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. London, 1979, 
197. 
8 John MCGARRY and Brendan O’LEARY, ‘Must Pluri-National Federations Fail?’, Ethnopolitics 8, no. 1 
(2009): 5–25. 
9 Russell J DALTON, ‘Communists and Democrats: Democratic Attitudes in the Two Germanies’, British 
Journal of Political Science 24, no. 4 (1994): 469–93; William MISHLER and Richard ROSE, ‘Five Years After 
the Fall: Trajectories of Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe’, in Critical Citizens: Global 
Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Norris Pippa. New York, 1999, 78–99. 
10 Elisabeth BAKKE and Nick SITTER, ‘Why Do Parties Fail? Cleavages, Government Fatigue and Electoral 
Failure in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary 1992–2012’, East European Politics, 8 May 2013, 1–18; 
Johanna Kristin BIRNIR, ‘Divergence in Diversity? The Dissimilar Effects of Cleavages on Electoral Politics in 
New Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 3 (2007): 602–19. 
11 Margit TAVITS, ‘The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe’, 
American Journal of Political Science, 2005, 283–98. 
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democratizing political systems are more prone to crisis, and only those representatives 
committed to accountability to their segmented electorate are likely to survive electoral cycles 
in the democratic regimes.12  
There is a broad agreement across studies of electoral politics that inclusion of interests of 
social, economic and ethno-cultural minority groups is essential for consolidation of 
democratic politics.13 Inclusion of all segments of the population is particularly important in 
the context of promoting and guaranteeing civil and political rights for all parts of the citizenry. 
Importantly, addressing social and economic inequalities in Central and Eastern European 
societies after the end of the communist regimes, has been central to addressing electorates’ 
view of politics as a democratic process where rules of the game can be renegotiated. Though 
some have criticized the view that competition drives national agendas in electoral processes,14 
most scholars agree that an ethnic security dilemma re-enforces boundaries between ethnic 
groups that spill over into the democratic political process.15 To this effect John Paul Lederach 
states that ‘people, when threatened, seek security in narrower, more localized [ethnic or 
religious] identity groups,’16 reducing the resources of non-dominant elites and motiving ethno-
political mobilization to central authorities. 
However, the earlier hopes of a gradual conversion of electoral politics in the post-
communist region with those observed in the more established democracies, have failed to 
materialize. Across ethnically divided post-communist societies, levels of ethno-political 
mobilization remain high and political parties continue to galvanize electorates by talking up 
the issues of perceived difference in rights and opportunities of ethnic groups. We therefore 
need to ask ourselves, whether the post-communist condition per se, or a more narrow set of 
factors, such as ethnic division of societies, volatility of electoral politics, and unresolved 
claims to scarce political and socioeconomic resources of the state have prevented the 
‘normalization’ of electoral politics in ethnically divided societies. Throughout the post-
communist history, ownership over institutions of the state has been contested and re-designed 
to be exclusive to serve best the culturally-distinct peoples seeking self-determination.17  
                                                 
12 Aleksandra ZDEB, ‘Prud and Butmir Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Intra-Ethnic Competition from the 
Perspective of Game Theory’, Ethnopolitics (ahead-of-print, 18 February 2016), 
doi:10.1080/17449057.2016.1143661; Boyka STEFANOVA, ‘Ethnic Nationalism, Social Structure, and Political 
Agency: Explaining Electoral Support for the Radical Right in Bulgaria’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 32, no. 1 
(2009): 1–23; Zoe LEFKOFRIDI, Markus Wagner, and Johanna E. Willmann, ‘Left-Authoritarians and Policy 
Representation in Western Europe: Electoral Choice across Ideological Dimensions’, West European Politics 
(ahead of print): 1–26. 
13 Simon HIX, ‘Elections, Parties and Institutional Design: A Comparative Perspective on European Union 
Democracy’, West European Politics 21, no. 3 (1998): 19–52; Kris DESCHOUWER, ‘The Decline of 
Consociationalism and the Reluctant Modernization of Belgian Mass Parties’, How Parties Organize: Change 
and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1994, 80–108. 
14 Susan OLZAK, The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict. Stanford, 1992; Susan OLZAK, The Global 
Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Mobilization. Stanford, 2006. 
15 Barry R. POSEN, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 27–47; Paul ROE, 
‘The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a Tragedy’?’ Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 2 (1999): 
183–202. 
16 John Paul LEDERACH, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, 1997, 
18. 
17 Michael Hechter, ‘Containing Nationalism’, Social Forces 79, no. 3 (2001). 
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We do not see ethno-political mobilization of non-dominant groups in emerging 
democracies as an ‘intoxicating brew, leading in case after case to ill-conceived wars.’18 More 
to the point, Mark Bessinger claims that ethno-nationalism might have a positive effect on 
democratization when non-dominant groups mobilize against outright disempowerment and 
side-lining in democratic politics, hence aiding democratic process.19 This observation has 
informed Andreas Wimmer et al to suggest that non-dominant ethnicities are more likely to 
engage in open conflict with a democratizing state than with any other non-democratic 
regime.20 Thus, including minority representatives in political decision-making allows for 
disputes over the remit of minority participation in political process to become an adequate 
component of electoral politics, rather than a reason to resort to interethnic strife and violence.  
Donald Horowitz’ Ethnic groups in conflict suggests that multiple ethnic groups threaten to 
derail democratization because identity determines the ‘distribution of important material and 
nonmaterial goods.’21 Though divided societies are not unsuited for democratic electoral 
politics, nepotism,22 lower organizational costs23 and economic inequalities24 all have positive 
impacts on ethno-political mobilization. Thus unsurprisingly, Horowitz argues that 
majoritarian or minority rule might be detrimental to establishing a representative democracy 
as voters are likely to make choices of political representatives from their ethnic ilk, and this 
holds for both the initiation of and maintaining the democratization dynamics. Wimmer et al 
however make an important corrective to claims of ethnic origins of conflicts in democratizing 
states.25 Paying attention to the ‘configuration of power’ and avenues available to different 
groups to access and participate in political institutions, to share power effectively distinguishes 
pathways for democratic consolidation.  
Since Arendt Lijphart’s description of the most effective mechanisms for governing divided 
societies, ‘power-sharing’ has been the popular recipe for making political entrepreneurs of 
contending groups cooperate.26 As in many cases across the globe, including Northern Ireland, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iraq, consociationalist arrangements have been put into practice 
when designing constitutional futures of divided post-conflict societies. Though Lijphart’s 
                                                 
18 Edward MANSFIELD and Jack SNYDER, ‘Democratization and the Danger of War’, International Security 20, 
no. 1 (1995): 5–38. 
19 Mark R. BEISSINGER, ‘A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization’, Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 
(2008): 85–97. 
20 Andreas WIMMER, Lars-Erik CEDERMAN, and Brian MIN, ‘Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A 
Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set’, American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (2009): 316–37. 
Lars-Erik CEDERMAN, Andreas WIMMER, and Brian MIN, ‘Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and 
Analysis’, World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 21. 
21 Donald L. HOROWITZ, ‘Democracy in Divided Societies’, in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy, 
ed. Larry DIAMOND and Marc F. PLATTNER. London, 1994. 
22 Tatu VANHANEN, ‘Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis’, Journal of 
Peace Research 36, no. 1 (1999): 55–73. 
23 Nicholas SAMBANIS, ‘Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and 
Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (2001): 259–82. 
24 Demet Yalcin MOUSSEAU, ‘Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?’, Journal of Peace 
Research 38, no. 5 (2001): 547–67. 
25 WIMMER, CEDERMAN, and MIN, ‘Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New 
Global Data Set’. 
26 Arend LIJPHART, ‘Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma’, The American Political 
Science Review 91, no. 1 (1997): 1–14. 
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early works see ‘culturally divided’ societies as the object of political engineering, 
contemporary prophets of consociationalism John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary point out 
that ethnic identities are distinct from those chosen in electoral politics and underlying the 
system of political representation.27  
It is a more fluid view of identity that anticipates an increased interaction and eventual 
retreat of identities from politicking.28 Yet in a political process that forces citizens to rank-
order their choices among different candidates on the ballot paper, ‘political and social 
organizations founded on ethnic belonging rather than on individual choice’ have barely 
succeeded in managing ethnic conflict.29 As a result polities operating on the basis of power-
sharing exacerbate ethnic cleavages in divided post-conflict societies.30  
Unsurprisingly therefore, Wimmer et al see ethnic exclusion in politics as one of the main 
drivers of ethnic conflict.31 When political structures provide little opportunity for participation 
and limited space for nonviolent pursuit of goals for political entrepreneurs of non-dominant 
groups, we are indeed very likely to see entrenchment of ‘tribal politics’ in democratic electoral 
processes.32 Timothy Sisk further claims that however no matter how democratic political 
procedures are, simple majority rule is badly suited for institutional change and does not bid 
well for democratic stability, resulting in mobilization of non-dominant groups.33 Wolfgang 
Merkel and Brigitte Weiffen further refine this argument by analyzing third wave democracies, 
concluding that political institutions, alongside principles and procedures of the new political 
regime, help to inscribe intergroup equality into the fabric of electoral politics in the newly 
democratizing states, and make democratic consolidation possible even in the most 
heterogeneous societies.34  
Ominously, Richard Rose and William Mishler proclaimed that post-communist publics 
value democracy not for what it is, but rather for what it is not.35 Looking into the details of 
the 2013 municipal as well as the 2014 Assembly elections in Kosovo will allow us to assess 
the degree of ethnic politicking and clientelism in electoral politics in this country. Probing 
deeper into discourses preceding the elections and focusing on preferences of elected 
politicians, we are able to identify what different ethnic segments in Kosovo society favor in 
this new democracy, and what they do not.  
                                                 
27 John McGARRY and Brendan O’LEARY, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of 
Protracted Ethnic Conflicts. Abingdon, 2013. 
28 Beáta HUZKA, ‘Framing National Identity in Independence Campaigns: Secessionist Rhetoric and Ethnic 
Conflict’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 20, no. 2 (2014): 153–73. 
29 Marc Morjé HOWARD, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe. New York, 2009. 
30 Melani CAMMETT and Edmund MALESKY, ‘Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace 
and Governance’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 6 (2012): 982–1016. 
31 CEDERMAN, WIMMER, and MIN, ‘Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis’. 
32 LEDERACH, ‘Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies’. 
33 Anna K. JARSTAD and Timothy D. SISK, From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. New York, 
2008. 
34 Wolfgang MERKEL and Brigitte WEIFFEN, ‘Does Heterogeneity Hinder Democracy?’, Comparative Sociology 
11, no. 3 (2012): 387–421. 
35 William MISHLER and Richard ROSE, ‘Five Years After the Fall: Trajectories of Support for Democracy in 
Post-Communist Europe’, in Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Norris Pippa 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 78–99. 
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Dynamics in politics and the importance of elections 
Citizens of post-communist states had lifelong experience of undemocratic rule prior to the 
break-up of communist regimes, and many of them remain attached to the mind-set of the 
earlier however authoritarian, yet at all times undemocratic, regimes.36 Yet in view of the 
importance of opportunities opened after the start of the democratic transition, preferences for 
political participation in decision-making among publics should not be equated with 
unconditional or unwavering pursuit of collective good.37 Some of these same phenomena have 
been observed in divided societies, particularly as tantamount to support of ethnic clientelism.  
Support for democracy is often believed to reflect the psychologically loose attachment 
citizens have to the positive symbols of democracy, such as sovereignty over territory and self-
determination of its peoples. Citizens of new democracies assess the new political regime in 
which they find themselves by not only, or rather not mainly, estimating favorable democratic 
ideals and practices they experience. Little experience and limited sophistication of the 
workings of democratic politics are found to make participation in the political process driven 
by uncertainty over whether democracy or any other political regime offers satisfying solutions 
to the many problems facing societies. Under such uncertainty, citizens who are democratic 
novices often embrace both democratic and authoritarian political propensities concurrently, 
and participation in democratic politics does not necessarily mean rejection of authoritarianism 
or vice versa.38  
With these dynamics in mind, our main research question addresses the existence of a 
correlation between levels of ethno-political mobilization and successful political 
entrepreneurs’ capitalization of these agendas after the elections.39 Overall, findings on this 
link will allow for a qualified statement on the ‘normalization’ of electoral politics in ethnically 
divided societies in particular, and the impact of ethno-political cleavages on the process of 
democratization in general.40 More broadly, we will be able to conclude whether political 
processes and electoral politics in post-conflict societies have a similar impact on support for 
democracy as an ideal form of regime as had been previously demonstrated in other countries.41 
                                                 
36 William MISHLER and Richard ROSE, ‘Learning and Re-Learning Regime Support: The Dynamics of Post-
Communist Regimes’, European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 1 (2002): 5–36. 
37 Ada W. FINIFTER and Ellen MICKIEWICZ, ‘Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for 
Political Change’, American Political Science Review 86, no. 4 (1992): 857–74. 
38 Marta LAGOS, ‘Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America’, Journal of Democracy 12, no. 1 (2001): 137–
45; Richard ROSE, Doh C. SHIN, and Neil MUNRO, ‘Tensions Between the Democratic Ideal and Reality: South 
Korea’, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, 1999, 146–65. 
39 Carsten JENSEN and Svend-Erik SKAANING, ‘Modernization, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Democracy’, 
Democratization 19, no. 6 (2011): 1117–37; Jørgen MØLLER and Svend-Erik SKAANING, ‘Beyond the Radial 
Delusion: Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy and Non-Democracy’, International Political Science 
Review 31, no. 3 (2010): 261–83. 
40 John D. MCCARTHY, Jackie SMITH and Mayer N. ZALD, ‘Accessing Public, Media, Electoral, and 
Government Agendas’, ed. Doug McADAM and Mayer N. ZALD. John D. McCARTHY (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press., 1999); John T. ISHIYAMA, ‘Founding Elections and the Development of 
Transitional Parties: The Cases of Estonia and Latvia, 1990-1992’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26, 
no. 3 (1993): 277–99. 
41 Samuel H. BARNES and Janos SIMON, Popular Conceptions of Democracy in Postcommunist Europe. 
Budapest, 1998; Bryan D. SILVER and Kathleen M. DOWLEY, ‘Measuring Political Culture in Multiethnic 
Societies: Reaggregating the World Values Survey’, Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 4 (2000): 517–50; 
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The working hypothesis is that high level of commitment to ethno-political mobilization is 
associated with low levels of normalization of electoral politics and high support for ethno-
political rhetoric.  
Yet at a more fundamental level, post-communist societies historically have had low levels 
of trust in politicians, political institutions and have been reluctant to participate in any kind of 
political activity, including elections. There has been one notable exception to this rule: where 
concerns for ethnic identity have formed a strong motivation to forge political alliances these 
regularly bring citizens to the ballot box. Particularly in ethnically divided and post-conflict 
societies, social and political cleavages between ethnic segments of electorate are often 
effectively reframed to attract electoral support and ensure stable political alliance during the 
electoral cycles. The resulting landscapes of electoral politics witnesses a perceptible shift 
towards political parties capitalizing on ethnic, rather than social, cleavages and fostering 
political rhetoric that mobilizes ethnic electorate. The literature on ethnically divided societies 
makes clear that once incentives are in place for political representatives to cater exclusively 
for ethnic constituencies, forging political alliances to bridge the ethnic divide becomes 
extremely difficult.42 Furthermore, higher levels of political salience, expressed differences in 
cultural markers and deeper differences of group experiences in the past, makes it more difficult 
for the electorate to re-align expectations from their political representatives in post-conflict 
societies. 
This evolution runs against the grain of electoral politics in Western European democracies 
and across much of the EU, which is leading post-conflict reconstruction, and overseeing state 
building in the states of the Western Balkans. Two states in the Western Balkans, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina and Kosovo, have a unique dynamic in electoral party politics, particularly where 
success in political reform is connected to the prospect of the EU membership. The prospect is 
ever more pertinent since societies in these states maintain several social axes, including 
ethnicity and language, and spectrums of winners and losers of transition. Previously, much 
attention has been given to electoral politics in post-conflict societies with analysis from the 
point of view of consolidation. However, few have analyzed electoral politics using the 
perspective of divided societies and none through the focus on crucial points in the life of 
democracies, the election, to signpost the abatement of, if not the normalization in, ethnic 
politicking.  
We have chosen Kosovo as a country case, because a range of comparative and longitudinal 
research on democratization, role of parties and politicization of identities demonstrates high 
volatility in terms of political stability and ethnic politicking in this country.43 This is despite 
                                                 
Bernhard WESSELS and Hans-Dieter KLINGEMANN, ‘Parties and Voters—Representative Consolidation in 
Central and Eastern Europe?’, International Journal of Sociology 36, no. 2 (2006): 11–44. 
42 Adrian GUELKE, Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided Societies. Basingstoke, 
2010.  
43 Fred COCOZZELLI, ‘Between Democratisation and Democratic Consolidation: The Long Path to Democracy in 
Kosovo’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 2013, 1–19; Karin DYRSTAD, ‘Does Civil War Breed 
Authoritarian Values? An Empirical Study of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia’, Democratization 20, 
no. 7 (2013): 1219–42; Denisa KOSTOVICOVA, Mary MARTIN, and Vesna BOJICIC-DZELILOVIC, ‘The Missing 
Link in Human Security Research: Dialogue and Insecurity in Kosovo’, Security Dialogue 43, no. 6 (2012): 
569–85; Gëzim KRASNIQI, ‘Equal Citizens, Uneven Communities: Differentiated and Hierarchical Citizenship 
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the widespread involvement of the EU and international organizations in developing the 
democratic hardware in the country and sponsoring, by a variety of means, the effective 
installation of democratic software with its political elites.  
 
Electoral Study: Local Elections in Kosovo 
The 2013 local elections for municipal mayors and assembly members cannot be 
understood independently of the circumstances in which Kosovo became a political entity. 
Successful execution of municipal elections in all 38 municipalities was anticipated as an 
indicator for confidence in the government’s ability to conduct democratic processes across 
the entire territory, and the development of Kosovo as a democratic, multi-ethnic state. 
Furthermore, the participation of Serbs parties and voters, facilitated in northern 
municipalities by Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was sought 
as an output of the Pristina-Belgrade normalization process, and an implemented provision of 
the Brussels Agreement. Widespread Serb participation was also anticipated as a minority 
endorsement for forming a decentralized body, the Association/Community of Serb 
Municipalities (A/CSM), which was also an agreed provision in the Brussels Agreement and 
would increase the degree of ethnic decentralization in Kosovo, whilst bringing the Northern 
municipalities into the fold44 Minority Serb ethnic parties in Mitrovica North, Leposavic, 
Zvecan and Zubin Potok municipalities,  had consistently resisted previous attempts by 
international actors to integrate the north into Kosovo institutions, and boycotted all elections 
held in Kosovo since its independence.45 This prospective electoral mobilization meant that 
the participation of minority ethnic parties, and the mechanisms of facilitating this, became a 
divisive ethno-political issue among representatives of both majority and minority parties 
throughout the campaign.  
Positions of ethno-political entrepreneurs and their election campaigns, particularly 
regarding issues of ethnic inclusion, minority participation, and ownership of institutions, can 
be examined through the lens of ethnic majority and minority parties, and focused on parties 
appealing to the majority ethnic community (Albanians), and the numerically largest minority 
(Serbs), although ethnic parties representing members of Bosniak, Roma, Gorani, Ashkali, 
Egyptian and other communities also competed. The reasons for this analytical division are 
twofold. Firstly, almost all candidates adhered to ethnic cleavage by appealing exclusively to 
their ethno-linguistic communities, using mono-lingual media channels to communicate with 
voters.46 Secondly, majority and minority parties postured themselves in an outbidding 
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process against co-ethnic parties when either criticising the record of their competitors, or 
making claims about minority governance issues.  
Majority, ethnic-Albanian, party campaigning over identity issues prior to the election 
promulgated the following concerns: facilitation of minority voting; integration of the Serb 
minority through institutional design; and the influence of external governments over minority 
parties, namely Serbia. Throughout the campaign for the Albanian vote, parties posited 
themselves along a spectrum of those parties supportive of Serb participation in the electoral 
process and subsequent institutions, and those who vehemently opposed any steps to encourage 
minority voter turnout. 
On the facilitation of the election in Serb majority municipalities, and participation of Serb 
ethnic parties, the most moderate campaign was run by the centre-right Democratic Party of 
Kosovo (PDK), the incumbent party led by Prime Minister Hashim Thaci. Whether out of 
genuine conviction for a multi-ethnic, inclusive Kosovo, or as a pragmatic choice to assist the 
pursuit of EU integration due to pressure from international actors, the PDK made repeated 
public appeals for Serbs to participate in local elections.47 Representatives of the centre-right 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) joined with other opposition parties to condemn the 
proposed visits by members of the Serbian government, such as the then-Prime Minister Ivica 
Dacic, to Serb majority municipalities during the election campaign, arguing that this violated 
both regulations on political visits during the campaign period, and Kosovo’s sovereignty.48 
This differed to the PDK, who publically welcomed the visit as an opportunity to encourage 
Serbs to vote.49 The use of status-neutral ballots in the northern municipalities – an important 
pre-requisite for Serb voters – and visits of some Serbian officials to Kosovo, were vocally 
opposed by the self-determination movement Vetevendosje (VV), who claimed that both 
violated the constitution, and showed that the elections were being conducted on Serbia’s 
terms, thus threatening Kosovo’s sovereignty.50  
Minority participation in Kosovo institutions, such as forming the decentralized 
Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM), was another identity-framed 
concern around which some Albanian ethnic parties mobilized. As Thaci was a signatory to 
the Brussels Agreement, and the PDK had previously formed governing coalition with the 
Serb-minority Independent Liberal Party (SLS) under Kosovo’s power-sharing constitution, 
the PDK was comparatively distinguished to majority voters as being in favour of minority 
integration, particularly as statements were disseminated through Albanian-language and 
international media outlets. However, other members of the PDK and members of the Alliance 
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for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) made negative public statements about their support for both 
the agreement and attempts to integrate the northern municipalities.51 The most explicitly 
ethnic claims prior to the voting period were made by VV, who consistently opposed the 
Brussels Agreement and decentralization based on ethnicity, repeatedly arguing that the 
normalization process and concessions to minorities were creating a separate Serb entity in 
Kosovo, rather than integrating the northern municipalities.52 Despite their opposition to an 
agreement which facilitated the municipal elections, VV fielded candidates in almost all 
municipalities, in order to increase their power base outside of the parliament.53  
Mobilization of minority Serb ethnic parties, and the election campaign in Serb majority 
areas, was divided between parties which advocated voter turnout, Serb integration, and 
decentralization, as ways of protecting minority interests and continued habitation of Serbs in 
Kosovo, and an boycott movement, who violently opposed holding the election in the north, as 
a threat to the Serbian-supported parallel institutions in those municipalities. Parties who 
supported minority electoral participation were further split between those materially backed 
by the Serbian government (Citizen’s Initiative Serbian - G.I. Srpska) and parties who had 
stood in previous Kosovo elections. All of their campaigns were run on an identity, rather than 
issue, basis, although fears of losing parallel structures in the north was driven in part by 
material fears of losing employment and subsidies provided by the Serbian state.  
Open and preferential treatment of G.I. Srpska by the Serbian government meant that it 
dominated the campaign for Serb votes. The party was dogged by accusations of being a proxy 
for Serbia’s territorial claims over Kosovo,54 and of hoping to form the 
Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM) as a disruptive federal entity, 
replicating Republika Srpska’s behaviour in Bosnia-Herzegovina.55 There were also 
widespread allegations of intimidation towards Serbs, particularly in Partes and Strpce, to vote 
for G.I. Srpska, or worsening welfare as a result of severed economic support from the Serbian 
state.56 G.I. Srpska’s campaign revolved around negatively mobilizing Serbs to vote across 
Kosovo in order to block Albanian candidates from winning mayoral and deputy seats in Serb 
majority areas, which did nothing to challenge Albanian claims that participation of Serbs in 
the election threated Kosovo’s sovereignty, especially when these calls were echoed by Serbian 
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government officials.57 Campaigning on a more positive-integrationist platform was the 
Independent Liberal Party (SLS), who, as mentioned had already served as a minority coalition 
member in the Kosovo government, and had a record of participating in Kosovo institutions. 
The Serbian, Democracy and Justice (GI-SDP) also mobilised around supporting Serb 
integration, but they claimed that participation was possible without recognising Kosovo’s 
independence,58 aligning with G.I. Srpska’s strategic integration approach. 
The most extreme Serb mobilization against the elections was orchestrated by a boycott 
movement in the north, who used sabotage of election materials and intimidation tactics to 
dissuade Serbs from voting. They argued that to participate would legitimize Pristina’s rule, 
effectively end parallel structures of governance from Belgrade in the north, and therefore cede 
the four municipalities to Kosovo.59 As stated by one Serb official in Mitrovica North, “no one 
here wants Kosovo institutions. We who boycott hope the Serbian institutions will survive, and 
the ones who vote hope that they will keep Serbian institutions that way.”60  
Turnout across Kosovo was 39.95%,61 an encouraging result for those hoping to prove that 
Kosovo could successfully conduct elections with minimal support from the international 
community, as the elections were organised by Kosovo’s Central Election Commission, aside 
from the OSCE’s facilitation of elections in the four northern municipalities, In three of the 
Serb majority municipalities in the north, turnout was far lower, at 25.6%,62 and a re-run was 
required at 30 polling stations. This was due to violent attacks on several polling stations on 
election day, when masked men threatened voters, destroyed and stole ballot boxes, forcing the 
vote to be suspended.63 Voting was repeated at three polling stations in Zvecan and 27 polling 
stations in Mitrovica North on November 17, 2013.64 Meanwhile the high turnout in other Serb 
majority municipalities south of the Ibar was unprecedented, averaging 59.15%.65 The turnout 
for the re-run in Mitrovica North on the 17th of November remained stable, despite the risk of 
repeated violence from those opposed to the elections. This level of participation in Serb 
majority municipalities is significant, due to the risk of intimidation for citizens who turned out 
to vote for a second time. In addition to these re-runs, the second rounds of voting were held 
                                                 
57 Peter GEOGHEGAN, Kosovo Serbs head to the polls – again, Deutsche Welle, 7 November 2013, 
http://www.dw.com/en/kosovo-serbs-head-to-the-polls-again/a-17211698; B92, Dačić calls on Serbs to vote in 
local elections in Kosovo, 21 October 2013, 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=10&dd=21&nav_id=88059  
58 UNMIK Headlines, Ivanovic: Yes to elections, no to statehood (Tribuna), UNMIK Media Monitoring, 9 
September 2013, http://media.unmikonline.org/?p=24204  
59 B92, KM: Miting za bojkot izbora, B92, 17 September 2013, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=09&dd=17&nav_id=754705  
60 PRELEC, Something Completely Different in Northern Kosovo, 2 
61 General Statistics, Republic of Kosovo Central Election Commission, Pristina 2013, http://www.kqz-
ks.org/en/news/Details/153  
62 Adrian ZEQIRI / Lars BUREMA / Jérémie ZEITOUN, Kosovo Local Elections 2013: Lessons Learnt for 
Minority Communities, Pristina, European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo, 19 December 2013, 
http://www.ecmikosovo.org/?p=4322, 2 
63 European Union Election Observation Mission, Preliminary Statement: A Positive Step Forward for 
Democracy in Kosovo, 5 December 2013, http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/preliminary-
statement-in-kosovo-05112013_en.pdf  
64 European Union Election Observation Mission, Preliminary Statement.  
65 Statistics By Municipality, Republic of Kosovo Central Election Commission, Pristina 2013, http://www.kqz-
ks.org/en/news/Details/153  
13 
 
in 25 of the 38 municipalities on the 1st of December, to determine mayoral results, most of 
which were conducted peacefully.66  
The elections saw a number of incumbents unseated, with the PDK, LDK, and the AAK all 
losing some municipalities. Although the PDK won the largest number of mayoral seats and 
members of municipal councils, they lost several mayoral seats to the LDK in the second round, 
with this result interpreted as an anti-PDK vote, rather than support for LDK policies.67 
Vetevendosje unseated the LDK’s mayor in Pristina, marking their increasing popularity in 
recent years as a protest movement.68 These results could suggest that whilst the local election 
campaigns were dominated by ethno-political rhetoric and identity claims over institutions, a 
portion of electorate chose to hold the PDK to account for their dire record on employment, 
economic growth, and corruption.  
In the Serb-majority municipalities, Belgrade’s support for the G.I. Srpska paid off, with the 
list winning the highest number of councilor seats than any other competitors, and the mayoral 
seats of nine municipalities.69 Although this result was positive for both the Serbian and 
Kosovo governments, as it demonstrated Belgrade’s commitment to the implementation of 
aspects of the Brussels agreement, G.I. Srpska’s alleged corrupt and unfair campaign practices 
raises the question of Serbia’s commitment to democratically and transparently facilitating 
local decision-making over the mandates of both the agreement and the 
Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM). However, the significant turnout of 
voters across Serb municipalities in the presence of insecurity can be interpreted as preliminary 
acceptance of the Brussels agreement and the future of their participation within institutional 
structures of Kosovo by parts of the Serb community, for a plurality of reasons, and the boycott 
movement’s failure to maintain the status quo of parallel governance. The seriousness of 
violent intimidation, however, and the theft of ballot boxes and voter lists, should not be 
underestimated, as citizens’ ability to cast their vote safely and confidentially is a core standard 
for successful, free and fair elections, something which was not guaranteed for voters in the 
north. 
Fears over the nature of the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM) 
continued to dominate public debate, particularly as it was due to be formed in December 2013, 
dependant on Serb participation in the local polls. These concerns were stoked by statements 
by the G.I. Srpska mayor-elect of Mitrovica North, Krstimir Pantic, who declared that “We 
have won nine municipalities, where Serb citizens will never recognise the independence of 
Kosovo”.70 In January he refused to sign the mayoral pledge due to the use of Kosovo state 
symbols on the document, which he claimed violated the status neutral requirement of the 
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Brussels Agreement. This was interpreted by some analysts an example of how Belgrade-
backed officials could spoil institutional proceedings,71 whilst others questioned the 
willingness of the government to truly integrate Serbs in the north, and argued that the situation 
could have been avoided.72  
Majority elite concerns over minority participation in institutions and electoral processes 
returned to the agenda immediately following the election. Following G.I. Srpska’s success, 
ethnic representation in municipal institutions and the potential for Serb parties to build on 
these results at future elections, prompted a dispute over the proposed extension of the system 
of reserved seats for minorities in the Kosovo Assembly. The PDK supported a proposal from 
all minority community parties to extend the reserved seat system, which was due to run out at 
the end of the current legislative term, leaving the guaranteed seats for minorities in place.73 
This was opposed by the main Albanian opposition parties; the LDK denied ever agreeing to 
support this measure,74 and the Deputy Prime Minister Edita Tahiri argued that reserved seats 
were unnecessary, as “We have been very generous toward minority communities especially 
towards Serbs”.75 This discourse of zero-sum resource sharing, and limits to minority 
accommodation, is a continuation of the pre-election Albanian elite campaign rhetoric, 
extended from minority participation in the electoral process to ethnic plurality of institutions. 
Whilst the elections marked a turning point in minority participation, the success of VV in 
Pristina laid the groundwork for ethnic issues, in particular the reserved seats, minority 
decentralised institutions and the normalisation process to remain as prominent debates before 
the scheduled parliamentary elections in 2014.  
 
Electoral Study: National Elections in Kosovo 
Early parliamentary elections for the 120 seats of the unicameral chamber Kosovo Assembly 
were held on June 8, 2014, using an open list and proportional representation system across all 
38 municipalities. The election was called following the government’s failure to form a Kosovo 
Armed Forces from the current Kosovo Security Forces, as Serb MPs – whose vote was 
required to pass the legislation as an issue of vital interest to minority communities – refused 
to vote for the act, unless the reserved seat system of minority representation was re-instated.76 
This resistance represented both Serbs’ opposition to the establishment of such a force, and the 
mobilization of minorities against the constitutionally-scheduled change into a guaranteed seat 
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system of minority participation in the Assembly, which minority parties feared would reduce 
the number of seats available to them without the need to compete or reach the 5% threshold.77  
The 2014 national polls, such as with the 2013 local elections, held significance for 
Kosovo’s development as a post-communist, multi-ethnic democracy. The June elections 
marked the first parliamentary polls since the 2008 declaration of independence to be held 
across the entire territory of Kosovo,78 again with voting in the four northern municipalities 
facilitated by the OSCE on behalf of the CEC, and international pressure on both Pristina and 
Belgrade to encourage Serb participation. On the 6th of May Kosovo’s formal negotiations with 
the EU on the SAA were concluded, demonstrating the European Commissioner for 
Enlargement’s satisfaction with the conduct of local elections, and Pristina’s continued 
commitment to the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, rather than compelling 
progress in implementing required reforms.79 Another similarity with the local elections is that 
analysis of party campaigns and the main issues under contention is most effectively done by 
examining the contests for majority and non-majority votes respectively. The reasons for this 
are twofold; firstly, as with the 2013 campaign, almost all candidates adhered to ethnic 
cleavage by appealing exclusively to their own linguistic communities;80 secondly, the 
participation of Serb minority parties during the campaign period differed from that of all other 
political entities. 
A significant difference from the local elections was a shift from identity-based campaigns 
to issue-based platforms by Albanian majority parties. After governing Kosovo with four 
smaller coalition partners since 2008, the polls were a chance for voters to hold the incumbent 
PDK accountable for Kosovo’s slow economic growth, high unemployment, and widespread 
corruption. Aware of this, candidates from all mainstream Albanian parties focused on issues 
such as investment and job creation, rather than attempting to mobilize the electorate over 
concerns about Serb minority inclusion. Both the PDK and LDK campaigned on economic 
platforms, with pledges to stimulate wages, create jobs, and increase social welfare,81 and the 
AAK also raised the endemic spread of corruption under the PDK.82 
Mobilization along ethnic concerns was not entirely absent, however, as discourses of 
minorities’ roles in Kosovo institutions and ownership of the state by a titular nation still 
featured in the statements made by Albanian party members prior to the election. The PDK 
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unsuccessfully attempted to convince the LDK and VV to support the extension of reserved 
minority seats, in exchange for Serb votes for the Kosovo Armed Forces,83 and continued to 
make positive statements regarding minority participation in elections and state security 
structures.84 Once again, this inclusive approach towards minorities were constructed as an act 
of generosity by the majority, conditioned on behaviour and performance; Kosovo’s Minister 
of European Integration, Bekim Collaku (PDK), stated that ‘ultimately, we expect from them 
[Kosovo Serbs] to be constructive and make on contribution not only to promote the rights of 
their community, but also help to strengthen Kosovo institutions’.85 
Majority fears over Serb influence in the Kosovo Assembly were also expressed through 
pre-election opposition to reserved seats for minorities by Albanian opposition parties. The 
LDK continued their opposition to extending this system, whilst maintaining that the party 
supported integration of Serbs in Kosovo and the normalization dialogue with Belgrade.86 This 
contradiction is explained by the implicit rationale for the LDK’s problem with reserved seats; 
that following the turnout of Serb voters in the 2013 local elections, Serbs could achieve 
enough seats in the assembly to give them the deciding vote in the likely negotiations to form 
a coalition government. Given the PDK’s coalition with the minority Serb SLS, and their record 
of publically supporting minority integration, it was unlikely that the LDK would benefit from 
an increased number of Serb MPs. Accordingly, VV’s concern over the possible post-election 
coalition was rooted in the long-term belief that Serb MPs would be influenced by Belgrade 
politicians. They claimed that the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM) 
was an attempt to achieve a ‘Greater Serbia’,87 also repeating the zero-sum claim that that 
positive discrimination for minorities was causing discrimination against Albanians in state 
institutions.88 
Minority Serb mobilization in 2014 revolved around issues of inclusion and access to 
representation, with the dissolution of intra-ethnic Serb competition by the formation of a 
unified Serbian List (Srpska Lista). Having failed to prevent the termination of the reserved 
seat system, Serb parties’ pre-election discontent spilled over into the campaign period. 
Following the CEC’s decision that Kosovo state symbols would appear on all election 
materials, and that Serbs could not participate in polling station committees south of the Ibar, 
Serbian List representatives froze election activities and threatened to boycott, arguing that the 
use of such symbols violated the status-neutrality of the Brussels Agreement.89 A last minute 
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intervention from Serbian Prime Minister Aleksander Vucic resolved the stand-off, as he 
instructed Serbs in Kosovo to vote, stipulating that local mayors could not decide to boycott 
unless it had previously been agreed with Belgrade.90 This statement, and the subsequent 
resumption of campaign activities by Serbian List in the south, was a further indication that 
Serb leaders in Kosovo do not simply look to Belgrade for guidance; instead the level of 
domestic Serb engagement with Kosovo institutions is dictated from outside. Additionally, 
whilst Serb voters in 2013 were choosing whether or not to endorse the principles of the 
Brussels agreement and accept the transfer of some competencies from the Serbian state to 
Kosovo institutions, the dominance of Serbian List, and the control exercised over this party 
by Belgrade, made the quality of choice in the national elections questionable.91  
The results of the national elections, far from resolving the Assembly’s impasse, led to an 
unprecedented constitutional and parliamentary crisis which left the country in a political 
impasse when the parliament did not meet for almost six months. Nevertheless, the conduct 
of the elections was markedly more successful than the local elections in 2013, without a 
repeat of the violent incidents in Serb majority municipalities. Turnout for the elections at the 
national level slightly improved on the previous year’s local elections, as turnout across 
Kosovo averaged 42.63%,92 despite the short campaign period. Once again turnout was lower 
in the northern municipalities, where the average turnout was 25.97%, compared to the 
average turnout of 47.05% in the southern Serb majority municipalities.93 This can be 
attributed to the freeze of campaigning in the north, and their passive participation following 
the decision not to boycott. Despite the fewer incidents of fraud and voter intimidation across 
Kosovo, compared to the widespread electoral fraud of the 2010 national polls, citizen 
confidence in the accuracy of the voter list remained low, particularly due the remaining 
presence of 500,000 non-residents of Kosovo on this list.94 
The performance of the main Albanian parties was a minor improvement on the 2010 
national elections, with the PDK, LDK, Vetevendosje all wining several more parliamentary 
seats, and the AAK keeping their existing number of seats.95 Initially the PDK were declared 
the victors, with its pre-election coalition receiving 30.38% of the vote,96 and voter opinion of 
their previous mandate apparently positive. However, this success was short-lived, as each of 
the PDK’s potential coalition partners, the LDK, AAK and the new NISMA party, formed a 
majority coalition, in an attempt to prevent the PDK from retaining power. VV offered their 
position as the third largest party in parliament to this new bloc, and despite their opposition 
to the constitutional requirement of Serb representatives in the government of Kosovo and 
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demands to suspend the Brussels agreement, which would have made their participation in a 
governing coalition untenable, the offer was accepted.97 Subsequent confusion regarding the 
constitutional stipulations on pre and post-election coalitions, and the competencies of the 
Constitutional Court and the President in such situations, prevented either bloc from 
developing a government, or repeating the elections. In December 2014 the PDK and LDK 
established a grand coalition by achieving a majority with the required inclusion of Serbian 
List MPs, 98 thus ending the impasse, and consolidating the representation of Belgrade-
backed MPs in the government of Kosovo. This post-election politicking was a major test for 
the effectiveness of institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, to resolve the complexities 
of a power-sharing system which must guarantee minority participation, and the democratic 
maturity of political elites in Kosovo.  
The performance of Serbian List confirmed minority parties’ pre-election concerns they 
would not achieve more than the guaranteed number of seats under the reserved seats system. 
Despite the awareness that their acquiescence was necessary to support a governing coalition, 
they did not present any conditions of electoral reform of the minority seat system. Their 
cooperation during the coalition-forming process was supported by Belgrade; leader of the 
Serbian Assembly Milovan Drecan maintained that Serb MPs did not need to recognize the 
status of Kosovo institutions, ‘but they need to be part of them so that they can raise the voice 
of Kosovo Serbs, prevent discrimination against them, and contribute to the return of all Serb 
IDPs’.99 The statement highlights the pragmatic need for minority representation in political 
institutions and accommodation of the minority by the ethnic majority, but also raises again 
the influence of the Serbian government over Serbian List MPs. Serb voters’ acceptance of 
the diminished plurality of ethnic parties indicates that rather than being a positive vote for 
Kosovo institutions, Serb participation in the national elections shows a determination to 
continue being governed from Belgrade, without damaging Serbia’s EU aspirations through 
the persistence of parallel institutions. Whether Serb participation in Kosovo’s subsequent 
government genuinely represents the needs of the local Serb community, or acts as a 
destabilizing proxy for Belgrade, remains to be seen. Serb participation in the 2014 elections, 
and the focus on socio-economic issues by majority parties, indicates that whilst there was a 
slight move away from the identity based politicking of 2013, the continuation of both 
majority and minority ethno-political mobilization means that the normalization of electoral 
politics is still an ongoing process in Kosovo. 
 
Conclusions 
Our paper has discussed the impact of the ethnic cleavage on both the normative and 
practical support of political agendas, which catapult ethno-political entrepreneurs into office. 
The principles and practices of democratic accountability of a party and the alternative 
accountability of parties allowed us to generate a dynamic account of transformations of ethno-
political agendas in this ethnically divided society over the course of two elections. This was 
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primarily done through the lens of political parties experiencing, but also causing, those 
changes by making domestic policy choices explicit in the light of their constituent country, as 
well as of their external homeland’s aspirations to foster closer relationships with the EU during 
the electoral campaign. We identify the distinctive features of ethno-political mobilization in 
the form of horizontal-informal intra-ethnic agreements, and vertical-formal competition 
between different political parties representing distinct ethnic constituencies.  
Our overview of electioneering and outcomes of two recent elections in Kosovo provided 
us with the opportunity to evaluate electorates’ perceptions of the proposed set up of 
democratic institutions and policies put forward by competing ethno-political forces. In 
democratizing states particularly, electoral cycles provide a clear cut picture of public 
appreciation of the direction, dynamics and successes in elites’ attachment to ‘tribal politics’. 
Alternatively, we have witnessed some preparedness of Albanian and Serb ethno-political 
entrepreneurs to push through novel political norms, support the newly installed regime and 
commit to competing political, rather than ethnic agendas.  
Until the elections in 2013, the political landscape in Kosovo saw a great deal of ethno-
political entrepreneurship and the success of ethnically defined parties. Specifically, we have 
seen the re-election of the leading parties or government led-coalitions, the consolidation of 
long-time smaller parties into larger political conglomerates, and increasingly the emergence 
of parties and coalitions representing ethnically heterogeneous electorates. While this trend 
was observable in the run up to elections of 2013, in this paper we have showed how electoral 
politics has coped with these changes following the 2014 national Assembly elections.  
If anything, the participation of Serb voters in these elections makes it painfully clear that 
in Kosovo, as in most states, existence of democratic political institutions alone does not make 
political system a fully functioning democracy. Public support expressed by casting an electoral 
ballot therefore, has been differentiated into two broad categories: normative and practical. The 
normative level addresses the principle ideas about the social decision-making process as is 
mediated through political institutions of the state in whose political life citizens take part. The 
practical aspect reflects the issues which require correctives in policy, adjustments in the focus 
of governments, and ultimately parties’ profiling.  
On the other side of the ballot box, electoral politics force political elites to draw up the 
balance sheet and identify their goals by outlining policy priorities, and as such challenge the 
political programs of their competitors, which in the case of Serb ethno-political entrepreneurs, 
also includes political institutions of the state of Kosovo. In situations where the population is 
poor, government is weak, and the degree of ethnonational fractionalization is high, electoral 
politics turn into inter-ethnic contests for control over limited resources for political 
redistribution of power. In a nutshell, our observed elections have forced voters to decide upon 
the competency of political representatives to deliver change or ensure stability of provisional 
political institutions in Kosovo in a way corresponding to expectations of the public casting the 
ballot. However, the conduct of these elections demonstrates that whilst voters have this 
decision-making capacity, low turnouts, the presence of fraud, and significant pressure to vote 
from external actors, all point to electoral politics which still suffer from a deficit of democratic 
norms and practices. Meanwhile, the limited change of incumbents in elections lauded as 
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historic, suggests that accountability of political elites is not the highest priority for voters in 
Kosovo.  
Regarding aspirations for Kosovo to become a member of the EU, stemming from both 
domestic and European elites, successful conduct of elections is considered a critical step of 
democracy consolidation on the path to accession. This is entrenched both by the formal 
accession requirements but also by the conclusions of the EU’s Election Observation Mission’s 
reports after both the 2013 and 2014 polls, which emphasized the contribution of the 
“successful” elections to Kosovo’s development as a democracy, whilst simultaneously 
reporting the intra-ethnic nature of campaigning and incidents which hindered free and fair 
participation of segments of the electorate.100 
The ethno-political dynamics of the two elections studied here demonstrate another example 
of what Agarin and Kordell refer to as post-communist elites’ responses to EU requirements 
for change: namely, that ‘form has been confused with content’.101  Furthermore, having 
achieved the basic standard of multi-ethnic, competitive elections across all municipalities in 
Kosovo, such form has been publically welcomed by representatives of European institutions, 
regardless of the realities of electoral conduct, and despite official European Commission 
reports which highlight the need for electoral reform.102 The purpose of this paper was not to 
discuss enlargement fatigue of existing EU member states and Kosovo’s prospects of future 
membership, as this is covered elsewhere by a large tract of literature. Our study of these 
electoral dynamics, however, further adds to work which is skeptical of the progress for 
inclusion of minorities in Kosovo’s post-conflict institutions and the processes by which these 
institutions develop. These processes cannot be considered independently of the context of 
European norm promulgation and practices, and the various ways that domestic entrepreneurs 
in Kosovo, as within other post-Communist states, have interpreted them. 
As Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer point out, political institutions constitute nothing more than 
“the hardware” of representative democracy.103 To operate, this hardware requires the suitable 
“software” understandable to and accepted by society it governs. Both the scholarly community 
and policy circles recognize that what political elites make of democratic institutions and 
institutional opportunity structure is a key component of such software. The software 
installation process is incomplete until the matters affecting all voters regardless of their ethnic, 
social and economic backgrounds are intrinsically linked to stable political institutions. Citizen 
participation in choosing political representatives to sit in the government that is setting, 
implementing, and monitoring legal standards, and mediating intergroup conflicts through 
nascent political institutions, is pivotal. Only when an overwhelming majority of the elected 
representatives unconditionally supports democratic procedures, plays by the rules of 
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democratic game and are accountable to all citizens of the state, and not only to the co-ethnics, 
should we consider the software to be running effectively on the hardware of Kosovo, 
democratic political institutions. 
